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if we accept that Scheler is not that clear in the formalismus about the ontological status of values, 
might one ask how phenomenological commitments relate to value ontology. Consider Phil Blosser’s 
words:
…the chief defect of Scheler’s phenomenology, like all philosophies of value, was the 
weakness of his treatment of the ontology of values. The insufficient development of this 
fundamental aspect of Value Theory has left it especially vulnerable in a philosophical 
climate that has been distinguished, since the 1930s, by the major “growth industry” of 
heideggerian ontology, making this appear probably the most critical defect of Scheler’s 
formalismus*.  
in this paper, i will argue that being-an-act (akt-sein) will provide us with insight into 
Scheler’s value ontology. my efforts rest on two fundamental premises: showing how Scheler’s 
phenomenology opens up into ontology, and how being-an-act is understood with that opening in 
mind in Scheler’s idealism and realism essay. 
in Part 1, i argue how phenomenologists can reify one-side of the intentional relation and generate 
different ontologies, and these thoughts underlie the opening of the idealism and realism. in 
Part 2, i show how being-an-act opens up into ontology. in Part 3, i reveal how the participatory 
sense of realism is shown in the intentional relation, and how persons participate in value. in the 
final section, the “ontologization” of the intentional relation is found in the problem of reality. 
*Philip Blosser, Scheler’s Critique of Kant’s ethics, (athens: Ohio university Press, 1995), 16.
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scheler offers us a glimpse into his ontological turn in his “idealism-
realism” essays. This text opens up with a criticism of both idealism and 
critical realism with respect to three errors. first, both positions start on a 
false statement of the question. Second, both positions offer unsatisfactory 
understanding of the parts of the problem. Third, both positions share in 
the “false presupposition that we cannot separate what we call the existence 
or reality (realität) of any object (whether of the internal or external world, 
another self, a living being, an inanimate thing and what we call its nature 
(So-sein)”1 we cannot separate out the existence or reality of an object from 
its nature when it is immanent to knowledge or reflexive knowledge more 
generally. 
for scheler, this inseparability is a deeply troubling since both idealism and 
critical realism are ontological theses motivated by how we fundamentally 
relate to objects. Both critical realism and idealism of consciousness 
treat the nature of an object as inseparable from its possible immanence. 
understanding this separability thesis and its negation is a key to navigating 
both idealism and critical realism offered in idealism and realism. 
first, any realism accepts the fact that there exists a mind independent 
of its object. in scheler’s thought, this mind-independence amounts to 
accepting that the existence of an object is always transcendent to every possible 
consciousness. if the object exists apart from any knowing consciousness, 
the object can never be the content of any knowledge or consciousness for 
that matter. This error forces our hand to accept the wholly independent 
status of the object. The object stands detached and separated from every 
knowing consciousness. in such a view, there is no phenomenological 
givenness to consciousness. instead, at best, we only have representations 
or signs that stand in for the character of the object. a similar line of 
reasoning can apply to idealism. according to scheler, idealism is the thesis 
that all existing objects reside in the mind. it follows that such a thesis is 
committed to an erroneous falsehood. Thus, there is no existence transcendent 
to or independent of consciousness. as such, if the object exists as a constant 
dependence of the mind, the mind’s constant operation is needed in order 
to sustain the transcendence of an object. in idealism, being an object is 
conflated with being-an-act to the point that any articulation of the given is 
1  max scheler, “idealism and realism” in Selected Philosophical essays (evanston, il: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973):  288-356. Scheler, idealism, 288 here. 
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vitiated. There is no separability, and there is no getting at the core of what 
is experienced. The mind is in constant circular reference to itself such that 
whence it understands an object it cannot get out of itself to experience 
the transcendence of the given rendering phenomenological insight all but 
impossible. 
Both positions reify one aspect of the overall intentional structure 
described by all phenomenological thinkers. in scheler, the intentional 
relation has two sides—being-an-act and being-an-object. In Husserl, the 
subject constitutes the object. The constituting subject is one-side, the 
constituted object is the other. Phenomenological tensions arise when one 
puts more stock into one side of this intentional-relation than the other. 
if objects are not given to us in acts, but instead subsist on their own, 
independent of being given to acts, then a non-phenomenological realism 
is true. if the subject’s constituting is given prominence over objects to the 
point objects are rendered as mere representations of minds, then idealism 
is true. as such, the phenomenologist walks a tight rope between both sides 
of the intentional relation. scheler maintains this balance when he claims 
that one cannot reify either side. Such reifications can take hold when one is 
convinced entirely that a science can explain the sense of the world or that 
in explanation we must prioritize one-side of the intentional relation over 
the other. 
In Scheler, acts flash forth from spirit and are non-objectifiable. The being of an 
act “possesses its own mode of being only in the performance” of the act.2 for scheler, 
experiencing is its own mode of evidence similar to husserl.
in the broadest sense, evidence denotes a universal primal phenomenon 
of intentional life, namely … the quite preeminent mode of consciousnesss 
that consists in the self-appearance, the self-exhibiting, the self-giving, of 
an affair, an affair-complex, a universality, a value…3
we participate in the intentional relation with the world, and the 
participatory aspect of being-an-act captures the truest sense of scheler’s 
ontology yet-to-come. scheler insists that any act can be in relation to 
any possible kind of being. acts can be “analyzed in terms of its character 
or essence and its existence in some mode.”4 in this interpretation, 
intentionality and acts become the very ontological categories later on. 
2  scheler, idealism, 291. italics are mine. 
3  edmund husserl. Cartesian meditations: an introduction to Phenomenology trans. dorion cairns 
(Martin Nijhoff: The Hague, 1960), 57/92.
4  scheler, idealism, 292. 
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To understand my interpretation, we must understand how the intentional 
relation opens up into ontology.
it is by no accident that scheler begins next by advocating that knowledge 
is prior to consciousness and is itself ultimately “a unique and underivable 
ontological relationship (Seinverhältnis) between two beings.”5 This 
underivable ontological relationship is the irreducible participatory aspect 
of being-an-act.
a knows any being B when a participates in the essence or nature of B, 
without B’s suffering any alteration in its nature or essence because of a’s 
participation in it.6 
Thus, participation is ontological through and through. when albert 
knows the tree is alive, Albert’s knowing the essence of the tree requires 
an intentional relation. in vital feeling, one can apprehend the growth and 
vitality of the forest. one picks up on features of the growths or decay of the 
forest. Trees are given as unfurling towards the sun or given as wilting away 
in an unhealthy industrialized landscape. These aspects are given in feeling. 
at their root, all feelings are modes of apprehension and participation. There is 
no separable moment between apprehension of an object and apprehension 
requires participation in the world. Feeling-states are affected in relation 
to the world, but in their own directedness, persons participate in the 
very intentional relation at root in act being. for all the phenomenologists, 
subjectivity folds into the world, and the world folds back upon persons too. 
Thus, ontological participation in the essence of a phenomenon can occur in 
either act or object, but for his value ontology, I find it rooted in his being-an-
act.  yet, this interpretation can only work if phenomenology is linked with 
ontology in scheler’s work.
according to scheler, participation is non-causal, but rather the source of 
creation itself.7 when we relive an essence in co-feeling (mitgefuehl), we are 
participating in a phenomenon’s essence. if i stand before the forest, close 
my eyes and take in its vitality in one breath, i can turn to another say, “can 
you feel it?” Moreover, this participation-in-the-essence not only takes place 
with respect to intentional feeling, but also with respect to the already 
effected feeling-states and objective being. 
5  scheler, idealism, 292. 
6  Scheler, idealism, 292, italics mine. 
7  notice how love realizes and creates value in scheler’s nature of Sympathy trans. Peter heath 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2011.), 150-159. 
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we say that further of B when a participates in B and B belongs to the 
order of objectifiable being, B becomes an objective being (Gegenstand-
sein) confusing the being of an object (sein des gegenstandes) with the fact 
that an entity is an object is one of the fundamental mistakes of idealism.8 
The being of an object is that which can be given phenomenologically. That 
an entity is an object has no bearing on its givenness, and notice in the 
passage above, scheler attributes the becoming of an “objective being” to a 
fact of its participation and not its status as an object. 
now, i have been urging that the intentional relation is fundamentally 
participatory in a full-blown ontological sense. Scheler framed his definition 
of the intentional act to reflect this participatory status. An intentional 
act is defined as “the process of becoming (Werdesein) in a through which 
a participates in the nature or essence of B or that through which this 
participation is produced.”9 i come to be joyful through my participation in 
the essence of joy as experienced. moreover, this ontological interpretation of 
participation is present in the formalismus that discloses who we are as persons, 
it is the person himself living in each of his acts, who permeates every act 
with his peculiar character. no knowledge of the nature of love, for instance, 
or of the nature of judgment can bring us one step nearer to the knowledge 
of how person a loves or judges person B; nor can a reference to the contents 
(values, state of affairs) given in each of these acts furnish this knowledge.10 
Therefore, only participating in the essence of feeling discloses oneself to 
another. The knowledge of any particular act cannot bring us any closer to 
understanding that act itself without reference to the participating person. 
notice the language of persons in scheler’s formalismus. we only know 
the person “as a being that executed acts, and he is in no sense ‘behind’ or 
‘above’ acts, or something standing ‘above’ the execution and processes of 
acts.”11 instead, the whole person is simply contained in every act and there 
is nothing prior, before, or outside that gives rise to knowing the person 
except that the person permeates each and every act that she executes 
through participation! accordingly, execution is participation. The person 
participates in these acts wholly and concretely. 
Just as the person is known through the execution of acts, participation 
8  scheler, idealism, 292-93. 
9  scheler, idealism, 293. 
10   max scheler, formalism in ethics and the non-formal ethics of Value: a new attempt Toward the 
foundation of an ethical Personalism. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 386.
11  scheler, formalism, 385. 
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in and functionalization of the essence are two sides of the same coin. in 
idealism and realism, we have evidence for this interpretation: “thoughts 
and intuitions belonging to the human mind first arise through 
‘functionalization’ of insights into the essence of a thing, originally 
achieved in a single exemplary experience.”12 functionalization is the 
process whereby our ideas, concepts and the mind interact with reality. 
in that sense, scheler’s understanding of functionalization is very much 
akin to that developed in pragmatism or the operative everydayness in 
heidegger’s analysis of dasein.13 in this way, the a priori in scheler and 
heidegger is a material or existential a priori. unlike Kant, scheler’s a priori 
originates in the ontological participation in the active sense implied by 
functionalization. if our ideas mesh and function in accordance with reality, 
then our ideas work. if they do not mesh and function in accordance with 
reality, then they do not “functionalize.” Thus, persons intuit essential 
interconnection of insight into the nature of things derived from this 
interaction (participation).  in scheler’s words, “all functional laws derive 
from original experience of objects.”14 These insights become the basis for 
the rules and norms governing our future participation. meaning arises 
only from an interaction with the world through which all other subsequent 
apprehension and meaning of the world are made possible. Therefore, 
functionalization is participation. 
scheler observes that every intention points “beyond the act and the 
contents of the act and intends something other than the act.”15 Being-an-
act, therefore, gestures to an order and evidential insight not contained 
within the immediate immanence of the given. in this way, the intentio 
signifies “a goal directed movement toward something which one does 
not have oneself or has only partially and incompletely.”16 contained 
within being-an-act is an insight, a givenness of a content that is not 
present, a form of absolute evidence. The immanent givenness in scheler’s 
phenomenology therefore contains a sense of something or some structure 
beyond itself. absolute evidence given in feeling is what scheler calls value. 
according to scheler, the transcendence of the intentional object in relation 
to the intention and its present content holds for every being-an-object. for 
12  scheler, idealism, 312. 
13  for more on the connection between william James and max scheler, see my “The Jamesian 
appeal of scheler’s felt metaphysics” forthcoming in Comparative and Continental Philosophy, spring 
2014. 
14  max scheler, On the eternal in man trans. august Brunner (new Brunswick, nJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2010), 202. 
15  scheler, idealism, 296. 
16  scheler, idealism, 296. 
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scheler, mathematical objects, like the pure number three, have no physical 
reality, but are an ideal quality (like values). These ideal qualities, Scheler 
says, are “produced from the a priori material of intuition in accordance 
with an operational law governing the steps of our thought and intuition.”17  
Moreover, fictitious objects also possess the same level of transcendence. 
Scheler’s point is that proper to objects given to consciousness they acquire 
a transcendence all their own. for scheler, a distinction can be introduced 
between the transcendence of the object in principle from the existential 
status of objects themselves. in the latter, we are involved with the object in 
many different ways. we can talk about the different existential relations 
we have towards the sun, yet the transcendence of the sun in principle allows 
us to focus on its givenness in its real concrete phenomenological depth.18 
The distinction between transcendence in principle and existential status 
of objects does is remove our ability to ask about the ontological status of 
objects. my usage of “ontology” follows this line of thought. when i say 
“ontology,” I do not mean the reification of one side of the intentional 
relation on the part of the subject, namely, idealism, or the reification 
of objects, namely, realism. These two reifications are first introduced 
in idealism and realism since they are proffered as what scheler calls the 
“problem of reality.” instead, for scheler and myself, ontology has always 
meant the material unfolding of the intuitive givenness of a primordial affective 
depth at the heart of all existence to which all other forms of knowledge are 
subordinate. given the distinction of transcendence in principle from 
existential sense, it becomes silly to ask whether objects subsist in our 
minds or are produced by our minds. The problem of reality thus construed 
between idealism and realism has no traction. however what role does 
Scheler’s thought on transcendence of the object play? The consciousness 
of transcendence may make some headway about the problem of reality. in 
his articulation of the problem of reality, phenomenology opens up into an 
ontological space in scheler’s work. 
The transcendence of the object leads to an identifiability of the object in 
a plurality of acts. To use scheler’s example, no matter the being-an-act in 
relation to the meaning of the sun, the sun will be the same sun whether i 
relate to it as an astronomical body or a mysterious disk that hides behind 
mountains. This identifiability can hold for one object or many, nor is 
this identifiability restricted to ideal objects alone like Scheler’s number 
three. Identifiability is the result of a definite operational law and the same 
material of intuition that produces the act of the given prior to any sense-
17  scheler, idealism, 296.
18  scheler, idealism, 303. 
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experience. The transcending quality of the given object constitutes the 
sum of the same in all these manifestations. 
for scheler, there is only one-way consciousness of transcendence can enter 
into the problem of reality properly considered. 
The acts which consciousness is present can bring the givenness of 
reality…into “objective” form, and can therefore elevate that which is 
given in this way as real to the status of a real “object”. But with this, the 
contribution of consciousness of transcendence is at an end.19 
in other words, the being-an-act when described puts us into relation with 
what is to be described-as-real. The phenomenological attitude can bring 
aspects of reality into givenness. These aspects of reality, however, consist 
in our intentional relation to reality. when a phenomenon is properly given 
phenomenologically, the consciousness of its object’s transcendence can 
contribute no more to the status of its reality. all that can be established 
is the fact that acts relate to objects: in scheler’s words, “Whenever there 
is consciousness, objects transcendent to consciousness must also be given to 
consciousness. Their relationship is indissoluble.”20 self-consciousness and 
object arise in relation to each other simultaneously and through the same 
process. This process is ontological participation.
The intentional relation between the spiritual-act center of the person 
and the objects that accompany those acts is a process. This process does 
not occur in any one primary cognitive egoic act. instead, the process is 
more primordial and fundamental, and this process is the insight i have 
articulated about scheler’s phenomenological thinking. Phenomenological 
description is an attempt to acquire insight into the pre-reflective modes 
of how experience is first given to us. As such, “Consciousness of an object 
precedes all judgment and is not originally constituted by judgment.”21 
The sense of the real only comes from paying attention to the intentional 
relation, the fact that consciousness is a consciousness of reality. The sense 
of the world originates only from the standpoint of intentional experience, 
that is, in terms of how consciousness encounters the objects toward which 
it is directed.  
here, in idealism and realism, what scheler is doing with this intentional-
relational structure finds expression in the “pulling back” of the act in 
which “the ecstatic act knowingly turns back onto itself and comes upon a 
19  scheler, idealism, 298. 
20  scheler, idealism, 298. emphasis mine. 
21  scheler, idealism, 299. 
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central self as its starting point.”22 The unfolding structure of an ecstatic 
consciousness and its encounter is given in a reality (realität) of resistance 
(Widerstand). reality discloses itself to us as resistance. This resistance 
throws us back upon our self, and in this inward awakening of resistance we 
find reality disclosed personally. Here, Scheler gives flesh to the intentional 
relation. he “ontologizes” the process by which we come to know the 
simultaneous occurrence of self-consciousness (being-an-act) and the 
consciousness of the object (being-an-object). In giving flesh to the process 
of the intentional relation, scheler’s phenomenology opens up into ontology. 
The meaning of the intentional relation finds concretion in reality’s 
resistance. reality’s resistance generates the conditions of that intentional 
relation, and scheler informs us about the nature of givenness itself:
The consciousness of transcendence shows how mere ecstatic possession 
of reality on the level of immediately experienced resistance of an X to 
the central drives of life passes over onto the reflexive and this objective 
possession of reality.23
according to scheler, reality is encountered as a resistance to the life-drive 
(lebensdrang). These “central drives of life” are carried into the very being 
of our relation, but so is the transcendence of the object. later, scheler 
will develop a metaphysics in which both spirit (geist) and life-drive will 
each have their own developed principles in his unfinished philosophical 
anthropology. for now, the ontology of value rests on the awareness of how 
phenomenology opens spaces of inquiry that develop into these specific 
areas of concern. in my interpretation, there are many forces converging on 
that experience. These energies come at the cost of constantly undergoing 
experience of the world and how the feeling of reality constitutes and 
renews a persons’s experience of reality. yet, phenomenology can 
suspend in part aspects of our ontological participation in the world, but 
phenomenology cannot suspend reality entirely—that is, the sense of 
reality (realität) entailed in resistance. Part of fleshing out the conditions 
under which phenomenology and the intentional relation manifest is the 
ontological delimitation of what each may purport. reality slips away 
from our grasp, and we can only catch glimpses of the transcendence of an 
intentional object in the phenomenological attitude. 
it is the prior passage “the ecstatic act knowingly turns back onto itself and 
comes upon a central self as its starting point” that struck me as evidence of 
22  scheler, idealism, 299. 
23  scheler, idealism, 300. 
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the move from phenomenology as the description of immanent structures 
in the whole of idealism and realism to a phenomenological ontology. in 
fleshing out the intentional relation, Scheler provides further description of 
how phenomenology becomes ontological. Quickly after the above passage, 
scheler posits several spheres of irreducible reality:
1. The sphere ens a se, absolute being in contrast to relative being; 2. The 
spheres of the external and internal world; 3. the sphere of the creature 
and its the environment; 4. The sphere of the i, the thou and society.24
for each sphere, scheler provides a basic law: “the being of the sphere itself 
is always given prior to the individual empirical objects, which are given 
through the various types of perception and intuiting.”25 in other words, 
these spheres of being possess a givenness, a sense of them already in reality 
prior to empirical study. This givenness occurs within these spheres of 
being, and scheler has prescribed the totality in these spheres of what can 
be given. again, this passage is evidence for a phenomenology that puts us 
into contact with reality, suspends the fact that reality resists our affective 
drives in it, but in so doing, phenomenology identifies those transcending 
aspects in relation to and beyond me.26 
moreover, these four spheres do not map onto value-modalities or value-
feelings all that well. in some sense, the absolute reality more than likely 
refers to that which is absolutely given, and in scheler only that which 
expresses itself in spirit that could even occupy the absolute sphere of 
being—God and persons. However, the spheres of the internal and external 
world occur at all levels, but the sphere of the creature and its environment 
occur most prominently in vital value and feeling. Given this difficulty, 
i only want to point out that resistance now comes into play and scheler 
becomes mindful of the limitations of phenomenological attitude. for this 
reason, i turn to characterize precisely where this journey of scheler’s 
comes to fruition much later in idealism and realism in section 8: The 
Problem of reality.
24  scheler, idealism, 300. 
25  scheler, idealism, 301. 
26  scheler articulates that spirit is independent of human organization and phenomenology, 
and while “the structure of this world and the structure of spirit form one essentially connected 
structure in all their parts,” we can apprehend the form spirit takes independently of how 
we are organized: god (157). see his “Phenomenology and the Theory of cognition” in Selected 
Philosophical essays (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973): 136-201. 
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The problem of reality refers to the two central questions opening up Section 
8 in idealism and realism. scheler asks,
What is the givenness of reality? What is experienced [Erlebt] when 
anything whatever is experienced as real?27Scheler calls this the “question 
of the lived-experience of reality.” Since it is the first question, it reveals 
the final collapse of pure eidetic description motivating phenomenology. 
instead, scheler’s phenomenology has become a phenomenological 
inquiry into the ontologically participatory nature of intentional lived-
experience. lived experience becomes conjoined with a sense of the real. 
The real is now reality-as-a-whole, and its givenness. reality is given in the 
ontological dimension of life. unlike heidegger, scheler regards the vital 
experience of life as the point of contact with the world and its disclosure. 
Life is given in terms of the unfullfillment of drives that stem from worldly 
resistance. 
This drive of life becomes more and more prominent in scheler’s thought. 
one could see that already in the formalismus the vital sphere of both values 
and feeling is the most significantly developed of all his distinctions, and 
in the nature of Sympathy the analysis of the psychic bonds of community 
are articulated with a figurative sense of organism.28 for scheler, the 
organic movement of life is not simply contained in a distinction between 
life and nonlife. Throughout nature, scheler’s sees an animating principle 
of movement, and this movement in us is the tendency to move from the 
life drives [drang]29 towards ever increasing modes of spiritualization.30 in 
this way, the life drive is not random, but is an ordered striving towards 
higher modalities, and within us, it is a projection of possibilities. in a sense, 
participation is where vital-urge meets worldly resistance, and within that 
encounter, values are felt-as-real.
Heidegger put death first and foremost as that which lies ahead of ourselves. 
in this way, heidegger used vitalistic symbols and expressions to which his 
existentialism could not reach any further. in other words, the whole of 
Being given is our being-unto-death. unlike heidegger, scheler is putting us 
27 scheler, idealism, 313. 
28  scheler will even call his metaphysics a “meta-biology.”
29  i like rendering drang as vital drive, or vital urges of life. i do not think that frings’s later 
translation of impulsion connects this to the prominence of the vital sphere more generally in 
both feeling and value-content. while it might not be clear to the reader in this study, drang is 
put into operation alongside geist in scheler’s later metaphysics found in his phenomenology of 
religion and philosophical anthropology. 
30 for evidence of this increasing spiritualization, see scheler’s “Philosopher’s outlook” in 
Philosophical Perspectives trans. oscar haac. (Boston: Beacon hill Press, 1958), 9.
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first and foremost into contact with a greater whole. Scheler pays attention 
to the givenness of reality, and the disclosure of the world alludes to senses 
beyond the vitalistic drive of life intimated in heidegger’s existentialism. 
scheler describes the givenness of spirit even though the ontological 
dimension of human life is manifested within the movement of life’s drives. 
in scheler, the spiritual potencies reside within drang even though many 
may be drawn to interpreting a dualism in his thought.31 spirit is always 
already manifest within life. The phenomenological attention to the 
givenness on the part of scheler apprehends these two-aspects of the world, 
yet these aspects are disclosed as one and the same. 
as i said, the vital drives encounter the world and the world resists our 
efforts to fulfill its projected interest and prohibition. What I find ‘real’ 
is then that which withstands or resists the emergence of vital drive’s 
projected interest.  The sense of our ego emerges from such resistance. This 
encounter is the source of realism for what i am calling the participatory 
realism about values. within the sphere of life, i value the serene landscape 
of a park before me. i lose myself here from the de-personalization common 
from living an industrial life inside an office cubicle. I feel at peace here 
in the park. say a commercial developer is petitioning the state to develop 
this park. even though developing the natural landscape will bring jobs 
and an influx of well-paying jobs, the value of the forest is higher as a place 
of serenity than the economic utility it could provide, and it is important 
to the local community that such a place persist unspoiled. given that 
economic interests occur as agreeable in the sensible sphere, the pristine 
serenity of the forest is felt as more valuable in its current natural form as a 
green space in the vital sphere. moreover, in our age, these green spaces are 
disappearing rapidly.  
Their rarity reflects the disordered heart that has captured our age and can 
only feel the value of the forest as instrumental to profit. In my valuing, I 
experience the values as felt. They are felt in resistance to persons blind to the 
serenity of the forest and natural landscapes. 
strife constitutes life. strife is the experience of resistance when our desires 
or wants, and even our must basic vital-urges clash against a world that does 
not yield to them. The world is disclosed as that which resists and challenges 
us. it is an ontological principle of the world that its reality is given only in 
terms of resistance, and the vital urges are constantly in relation with the 
world. This principle of strife cuts all the way into our vital urges. we would 
have no urges if there were no strife and no resistance, as in the 
31  i have to really thank Kenneth stikkers for bringing this to my attention. 
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example above. moreover, this principle of strife cuts all the way down 
into our vital drives. Vital drive encounters the world in the experience 
of resistance preceding consciousness of experience. The vital drive’s 
experience of worldly-resistance is primordial; it is a foundation in itself just 
as much as the world is saturated in emotions prior to any other perceptual 
or epistemic act. in this way, this ontological dimension of experience is 
prereflective. 
The primordiality of worldly resistance means that humans suffer from 
an inability to fulfill these drives. Human life is, then, one of suffering.  
Therefore, scheler reveals that the impulse behind philosophy, art and 
science is to suspend the movement of this suffering. as Kenneth stikkers 
has noted, “Thus the task of all thinking—philosophical, religious, scientific, 
etc.—is, according to Scheler, to eliminate this and this means to make the 
world less real.”32 By suspending suffering, we do not make the world “less 
real” in a full-blown ontological sense. instead, we cultivate strategies of 
coping with that suffering, modes of participation.
in conclusion, i have attempted to interpret idealism and realism as a way 
to explain scheler’s value ontology. Values are given to us in experience 
and insofar as that givenness occurs in a phenomenological ontology that 
can be gleaned in idealism and realism, a phenomenologically-based realism 
can be defended. while the interpretation may not be novel in relation to 
Scheler’s work in particular, such an understanding can be quite novel if 
phenomenology can be extended to value ontologies in metaethics. in this 
short piece, my engagement with scheler’s idealism and realism should be 
considered the hermeneutic basis for participatory realism. 
32 Kenneth w. stikkers, “introduction to scheler” in Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge trans. 
Manfred Frings (New York: Routledge, 1980), 11. 
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